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INTRODUCTION 
In November 2015 the government launched a consultation about ‘out-of-
school education settings’ (‘the Consultation’).1 This widely publicised2 
initiative was motivated by concerns raised by OFSTED about the existence 
of ‘unregistered schools’, their physical conditions, staff not being suitably 
checked, and the type of education being provided.3 The latter concern was 
based on inspectors having observed ‘a narrow Islamic-focused curriculum’ and 
‘inappropriate books and other texts including misogynistic, homophobic and 
anti-Semitic material’4 and cohered with the government’s own broader 
‘prevent’ agenda.5 The Consultation proposes that ‘certain out of school 
education settings be required to register and be subject to risk based 
inspections’.6 
In his initial letter to the Secretary of State for Education, which raised 
OFSTED’S concerns, Sir Michael Wilshaw recommended that the 
government: ‘review the arrangements for home education to ensure that they 
cannot be exploited in order to avoid registration’.7 However these 
arrangements are not included in the Consultation, indeed it states that the 
proposals are: 
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‘ . . . not about regulating the education that parents provide their 
children in their home. The government continues to respect the rights 
of parents to home educate their children, whether at home or in a 
combination of other settings, provided a suitable full-time education is 
being arranged’.8 
The recognition of the fact that potentially large numbers of children are 
educated in unregulated settings is long overdue. But in attempting to sustain 
a distinction between ‘home education’ and ‘out of school education settings’ 
the proposals – which focus on both the form and content of education – 
create inconsistencies in the law and, as Wilshaw correctly advised, may 
result in more children falling under the radar.  
The aim here is not to evaluate the underlying premises or the 
proposals in the Consultation, but, rather, to examine and clarify the 
relationship between ‘out of school settings’ and home education. In doing so 
it revisits earlier debates about the regulation of home education and indicates 
the ways in which the Consultation exacerbates existing anomalies and 
reinforces the need for government action. In particular it highlights 
weaknesses and omissions in the Department for Education’s Elective Home 
Education: Guidelines for Local Authorities (‘the Guidance’). Largely unaltered 
since 2007, the Guidance  - which applies only to England9 - is in many 
respects out of date and fails to provide much needed clarity.10 
The article begins by locating ‘out of school settings’ within the broader 
legal framework about home education and identifies the relevance here of 
earlier debates about compulsory regulation for home educators. It then 
examines the monitoring powers and duties of local authorities, indicating 
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areas of confusion and tensions between the Guidance and the limited case 
law. Turning then to the vexed relationship between ‘safeguarding’ and home 
education it identifies uncertainties about the existing law, omissions in the 
Guidance, and demonstrates how the Consultation exacerbates the situation 
by effectively conflating ‘education’ and ‘welfare’. Exploring this relationship in 
more detail it examines the existing confusions about the meaning of ‘suitable 
education’ in the context of home education and highlights how the 
Consultation opens up this issue to debates about civic education more 
widely.  
 
LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under the current legal framework parents are required to ensure that their 
children ‘receive efficient full-time education . . . either by regular attendance 
at school or otherwise’11. While the expression ‘or otherwise’ refers to a 
variety of settings, it has long been recognised as providing parents with the 
option of complying with their duty to educate their children by way of home 
education; in effect establishing a conditional, as opposed to an absolute, 
right to home educate.12 Successive government’s have repeatedly made 
clear that it is this provision that upholds a child’s right to education, in 
compliance with Article 28 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (‘UNCRC’)13 and Article 2 of the First Protocol of the European 
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Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’). Consequently, all children of 
compulsory ‘school’ age must be ‘registered pupils’, provided with alternative 
provision by local authorities or ‘electively home educated’.  
Children who are ‘registered pupils’ at both maintained and 
independent schools are subject to an extensive system of monitoring and 
regulation. A critical question here is the definition of a ‘school’. The threshold 
for this is low and set out in the legal provisions requiring the registration of 
independent schools. These state that an independent school is: 
‘ . . . any school at which full-time education is provided for five or more 
pupils of compulsory school age or only one pupil where a child has an 
Education and Health Care plan, a statement of special educational 
needs or who is looked after by the local authority’.14  
‘Full-time’ is not defined by statute but government advice issued in July 2015 
to proprietors of independent schools states that: 
‘It is unlikely that a school operating for fewer than 18 hours per week 
will be able to meet the standards and register as an independent 
school and we anticipate that schools offering teaching of around 20 
hours per week or more will be providing full-time education and will 
therefore need to register’.15 
Where only ‘part-time’ education is provided such a setting is included, 
alongside independent schools, within the definition of ‘an independent 
education institution’.16 The proposals in the Consultation, which seeks ‘views 
on defining a threshold for settings to fall within the scope of this proposal’,17 
would require those providing ‘intensive education’18 to register and be 
subject to inspections, although on a different basis from independent 
schools.  
A child that is, in law, home educated may be educated in a 
combination of settings: at home and in ‘out of school settings’, which the 
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Consultation notes can ‘support home education’.19 The concerns raised by 
OFSTED indicate that in practice some may also spend time at a ‘school’ that 
is, but should not be, unregistered. The Guidance makes clear that parents 
who home educate may: 
‘ . . . choose to employ other people to educate their child, though they 
themselves will continue to be responsible for the education provided. 
They will also be responsible for ensuring that these whom they 
engage are suitable to have access to children’.20  
The Consultation’s proposals would change this position by involving external 
agencies in the registration and monitoring of some of these contexts, subject 
to thresholds yet to be determined, and the Guidance would require revising 
to address this. 
Where a child attends a registered school on a part-time basis as part 
of a ‘flexi-school’ agreement, the child is, in law, a ‘registered pupil’. This is 
the case even where the majority of the time the child is educated at home or 
elsewhere.21 
Addressing OFSTED’s concern about the existence of ‘unregistered 
schools’ requires no change in the law and is simply a question of 
compliance. But the task of discovering the existence of schools that should 
be registered and of part-time ‘out of school settings’, both of which, as the 
law makes clear, may be very small, is in practice made harder by the fact 
that there is currently no requirement for parents who elect to home educate 
to register with local authorities or to provide information about where or how 
their children are being educated. Without such a requirement it is not only 
impossible to know how many children are home educated but, in addition, 
parents who wish – for whatever reason – to avoid the attention of local 
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authorities and OFSTED may choose to educate their children either solely at 
home or in an environment that falls below whatever threshold is set that 
might trigger a duty to register an out of school setting. As the Consultation 
itself notes, ‘providers operating below the threshold would not be subject to 
any inspection’22 – this creates the potential loophole that Sir Michael Wilshaw 
advised the government to consider.  
The question of registration for home educators is controversial and the 
current law while clear is inconsistent. Where a child has never attended 
school or where a child is ‘naturally deregistered’ from a school, for example, 
transferring from nursery to primary or primary to secondary, parents are not 
required to register or seek approval from the local authority’.23 But where 
parents wishing to home educate are removing a child from a maintained 
school, while the Guidance makes clear that local authorities have ‘no legal 
right to insist’24 that parents inform them of their decision, statutory regulations 
require that the parents inform the school of their decision and the school, not 
the parent, is then required to inform the local authority.25  
In June 2009 a review of home education chaired by Graham Badman 
(the Badman Review), at the request of Ed Balls, the then Secretary of State 
for Children, Schools and Families, recommended the introduction of a 
compulsory national registration scheme.26 This recommendation was 
subsequently included in Clause 26 of the Children Schools and Families Bill 
2009 (the 2009 Bill). The 2009 Bill was considered in detail by the House of 
Commons Select Committee for Children Schools and Families (the Select 
Committee), which published a report in December 2009.27 Compulsory 
registration was widely supported by local authorities and by Sue Berelowitz, 
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the Deputy Children’s Commissioner, who argued that it was ‘not acceptable 
that the state should not be able to vouch for the education of so many of its 
citizens’.28 The Select Committee concluded that it was ‘unacceptable that 
local authorities do not know accurately how many children of school age in 
their area are in school, are being home educated or are otherwise not in 
school’, accepted that ‘existing databases could not provide an equally 
efficient and secure means to that end’ and that ‘a separate registration 
system for home educating families should be put in place’.29 However the 
Select Committee recommended that the system of registration should initially 
be voluntary, subject to a review after two years, after which, ‘if it is found not 
to have met expectations’ it recommended that ‘a system of compulsory 
registration would need to be introduced’.30 
The 2009 Bill was enacted as part of the ‘wash-up’ process prior to the 
general election in 2010. But as a result of the Select Committee’s concerns 
and extensive and highly effective lobbying by home educators, none of the 
provisions relating to home education were included. While apolitical,31 the 
home education lobby’s resistance to registration chimed with predominantly 
Conservative parliamentarians’ concerns about increased surveillance of 
parents and expanding the role of local authorities, particularly in education.32 
The government’s continued support of the status quo is evident in the 
Consultation. 
One of the criticisms of a compulsory system of registration was that it 
would fail to ‘solve the problem of “hard cases”’.33 In other words that parents 
who wished to avoid the attention of the local authorities, for whatever reason 
– legitimate or otherwise - would simply not register or indeed possibly send 
their child abroad. This is a valid concern but one that applies equally to the 
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new proposals in the Consultation that would require the registration of 
providers of some out of school settings.  
A critical issue for local authorities – which informed their wide support 
for registration - is the extent to which it would assist them in complying with 
their existing legal duties in relation to the monitoring of home-educated 
children. The crux of the problem here is the lack of clarity in the existing law 
about what precisely these duties are and the weaknesses in the Guidance. 
These are both examined in the next section. 
 
MONITORING HOME EDUCATION  
The key provision is the requirement under Section 437(1) of the Education 
Act 1996 that: 
‘If it appears to a local education authority that a child of compulsory 
school age in their area is not receiving suitable education, either by 
regular attendance at school or otherwise, they shall serve a notice in 
writing on the parent requiring him to satisfy them within the period 
specified in the notice that the child is receiving such education’. 
This makes clear that it is for local authorities and not parents to determine 
what is ‘suitable education’. An interpretation accepted by the Select 
Committee.34 This does not mean that ‘suitable’ can take only one form, 
indeed it is dependent on the ‘age, ability, aptitude and SEN of the particular 
child’,35 but a local authority is entitled to and should reach its own view of 
this, and this may legitimately differ from that of the parents. And of course the 
courts may be called on to resolve such disputes.  
As long ago as 1996 the Advisory Centre for Education argued that 
‘LEAS cannot fulfill this duty if they have no information about the education 
which is being given to a child otherwise than at school,’36 an argument that 
implicitly supports compulsory registration. However, in relation to this 
provision, the Guidance advises that ‘local authorities have no statutory duties 
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in relation to monitoring the quality of education on a routine basis’.37  It is not 
clear what ‘routine’ means in this context. It could be interpreted, narrowly, to 
mean that not all children should be monitored or, more widely, to suggest 
that the monitoring should simply depend on the circumstances of individual 
children, providing local authorities with discretion about how to proceed. 
However, the former interpretation is hard to reconcile with subsequent 
statutory duties about safeguarding, examined in the next section, and with 
case law discussed below – for both support a more pro-active role for local 
authorities. And while the duty above refers to what a local authority must be 
satisfied by before issuing a notice, it does not refer to monitoring prior to that 
point.  
The Guidance advises that prior to issuing a notice local authorities 
should ‘address the situation informally’.38 But the Guidance fails to provide 
any advice to local authorities about duties in relation to home-educated 
children in their area not known to them. Similarly it provides no advice about 
their duties towards children where parents refuse to respond adequately, or 
at all, to their ‘informal’ enquiries and where, consequently, they do not have 
enough information to be able to determine if the education provided is 
‘sufficient’. These omissions create uncertainties for local authorities and as a 
result practice varies considerably. 
The underlying problem here is the statutory expression ‘if it appears’. 
A key case here is Philips v Brown.39 In this case parents challenged the 
issuing of a school attendance notice on the grounds that nothing had been 
done for it ‘to appear’ to the local authority that suitable education was not 
being provided and that, consequently, the local authority was neither bound 
nor entitled to make enquiries of the parents. Finding against the parents, 
Donaldson J held that:  
‘where an authority has a duty to take action in particular 
circumstances, it also has a duty to be alert in order to detect the 
possibility that those circumstances exist. . . I do not accept that it 
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should do nothing. This would rightly be criticised as an attempt to 
behave like an ostrich – to put its head in the sand in order that it 
should not learn of anything which might place upon it the burden of 
discharging its duty to consider making and, in appropriate cases, to 
make school attendance orders. The most obvious step is to ask the 
parents for information. Of course such a request is not the same as a 
notice . . . and the parents will be under no duty to comply. However, it 
would be sensible for them to do so. If parents give no information or 
adopt the course of merely stating that they are discharging their duty 
without giving any details of how they are doing so, the LEA will 
consider and decide whether it ‘appears’ to it that the parents are in 
breach of section 36 . . . if the parents refuse to answer it could very 
easily conclude that prima facie the parents were in breach of their duty 
. . .’ 
This case is cited in the Guidance a number of times40 to support the position 
that while local authorities may request information and meetings, parents are 
under ‘no duty to comply’ but ‘it would be sensible for them to do so.’ This 
advice accurately reflects the judgment in the case. But confusion arises 
because the judgment read as a whole clearly suggests that a more pro-
active role by local authorities is either required by, or, at the very least, is 
compatible with their statutory duty under section 437(1) above. The present 
selective quoting from the case consequently creates, at best, confusion. For 
it is hard to reconcile Donaldson J’s interpretation that: ‘if the parents refuse to 
answer it could very easily conclude that prima facie the parents were in 
breach of their duty . . .’, with the subsequent advice in the Guidance that, 
‘Where a parent elects not to allow access to their home or their child, this 
does not of itself constitute a ground for concern about the education 
provision being made’.41 The problem is compounded by the Guidance’s 
failure to refer to other cases, which also support a pro-active role for local 
authorities.  
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The case of H v UK,42 decided before the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, helps clarify the impact of the ECHR.43 The following quote 
from the judgment indicates that while requiring parents to cooperate is not 
clear in domestic law, Article 2 of Protocol 1 and Article 8 of the ECHR cannot 
be used as a reason for non-cooperation:  
‘requiring the applicant to cooperate in the assessment of children’s 
educational standards . . . can not be said to constitute a lack of 
respect for the applicants rights.’ 
The case reinforces the well-established position that convictions of parents 
must not conflict with the fundamental right of a child to education as a 
whole.44 
More recently in 2012 in R (SD and PD) v Essex County Council45 
parents challenged the decision of a local authority’s Home Education Service 
to make a referral to the local authority’s Education Welfare Service. The 
referral had been made on the basis of the parents’ failure to cooperate with 
requests for information about their child’s education. The case was 
categorically rejected, application for permission to apply for judicial review 
was refused and the decision was upheld on appeal. This decision is 
important in emphasising the monitoring powers of local authorities for in this 
case it was later established that the home education the child was receiving 
was ‘suitable’.  
The issue of home education can also arise in the context of child 
protection and private family law proceedings.46 A recent example of the 
former is Re S (a child with disabilities).47 While not critical of home education 
per se the case highlighted how concerns about health and development 
could not always be separated from education as Roberts J noted: ‘one of the 
unintended consequences of the provision of home education for children with 
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complex medical needs is the potential that this creates for disengagement 
with health services, both universal and specialist service’.48 Supporting not 
only the power of a local authority to monitor pro-actively but also their duty to 
do so, the judge raised questions about the adequacy of the monitoring of the 
child’s education finding that, ‘As for the annual review by the Education 
Service, I do not think it is worth the paper it is written on’.49 And raising a 
more general concern she noted that: 
‘I question whether the right of parents to opt for home education is 
compatible with the rights of their children in many cases, not just this 
one, and if this right is to continue, surely the State must do much more 
to establish that the child is being educated according to his or her 
needs and that the child is not otherwise neglected or having his or her 
needs met’.50 
This comment is clearly obiter but it adds further credence to the judicial 
interpretations of the law that  - in contrast to the Guidance - support local 
authorities taking a pro-active role in monitoring home education.  
The case also raises questions about the complex interface between 
home education and ‘safeguarding’ more widely; an issue that touches not 
only on child protection but, as the proposals in the Consultation make clear, 
impacts directly on determining the meaning of ‘suitable’ education. These 
issues are examined in the next sections. 
 
‘SAFEGUARDING’  
Home education per se is not a safeguarding issue; a home-educated child is 
no more in any way potentially ‘at risk’ than a ‘registered pupil’. To suggest 
otherwise arguably demonstrates a failure to respect home education as a 
legitimate form of education.51 The Select Committee criticised the Badman 
Review proposals and subsequent provisions in the 2009 Bill, which would 
have added a safeguarding role to local authority duties in relation to home-
educated children, for ‘their conflation of education and safeguarding 
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matters’.52 Noting the existing and extensive statutory provisions relating to 
safeguarding, the Select Committee emphasised that the correct approach for 
home education services was to refer concerns about safeguarding to social 
services; mirroring the approach adopted by schools as a key referral 
agency.53 
However the Select Committee recognised the potential tension 
between the safeguarding legislation and the Guidance’s ‘emphasis on the 
limited applicability of these statutes to home education’, acknowledged that 
‘this in itself renders home education something of an anomaly’ and 
recommended both statutory clarification and clearer guidance on the 
matter.54 The Guidance undoubtedly requires revising to clarify the existing 
legislation, in particular the provisions relating to ‘children missing education’ 
and ‘child welfare’ more widely, for the reasons set out below.  
 
Children missing education 
Section 436A of the Education Act 1996 states that: 
(1) A local education authority must make arrangements to enable 
them to establish (so far as it is possible to do so) the identities of 
children in their area who are of compulsory school age but-  
(a) are not registered pupils at a school, and 
(b) are not receiving suitable education otherwise than at a school. 
With regard to this provision the Guidance states that, ‘The guidance issued 
makes it clear that the duty does not apply to children who are being educated 
at home’.55 The cross reference here is to separate guidance relating to 
children missing education. However this guidance was revised in 2013 and 
the new guidance issued made explicit that the provision does relate to home 
education and indeed there is nothing in the statutory provision to suggest 
otherwise. This guidance was revised again in January 201556 and while not 
as explicit the current guidance also makes clear that the provision potentially 
relates to children whose parents have elected to home educate. It states that 
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‘The LA should consult the parents of the child when establishing whether the 
child is receiving suitable education’ and that it ‘relates to children of 
compulsory school age’.57 It also advises that School Attendance proceedings 
can be used ‘to satisfy the LA that the child is receiving suitable education 
when it comes to the local authority’s attention that a child might not be 
receiving such education’.58 The latter reference to ‘when it comes’ clearly 
mirrors the statutory reference to ‘if it appears’ discussed above, although it 
arguably takes a more restrictive approach. This is unhelpful, as the case law 
above makes clear that the provision is not incompatible with a pro-active and 
investigatory role. A ‘home-educated child’ is not a ‘child missing education’. 
But where a child is home educated and the education is not sufficient then it 
clearly is. This provision clearly identifies a positive role for local authorities 
here, and it needs to be clarified by the Guidance. 
 
Child welfare 
Section 175 of the Education Act 2002 requires that: 
‘A local education authority shall make arrangements for ensuring that 
the functions conferred on them in their capacity as a local education 
authority are exercised with a view to safeguarding and promoting the 
welfare of children.’  
Local authority functions here are explicitly defined as including ‘the provision 
of education for children of compulsory school age otherwise than at a school’ 
– it clearly therefore applies to home education. The Guidance acknowledges 
this and advises that the provision: 
‘does not extend local authorities’ functions. It does not for example 
give local authorities powers to enter the homes or otherwise see 
children for the purposes of monitoring the provision of elective home 
education’.59 
The Guidance, unhelpfully, provides no positive advice to local authorities 
about this provision. One way in which it could do so would be by referring to 
the recent case of R (SD and PD) v Essex County Council, noted above. For 
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it made clear that a parental refusal to answer questions about the provision 
of education was itself a legitimate ground for making a referral to social 
services. 
 
‘SAFEGUARDING’ AND ‘RADICALISATION’ 
The Select Committee’s recognition of the potential tension between the 
safeguarding legislation and home education has been made more acute by 
the government’s locating of concerns about the ‘risk of radicalisation’60 within 
the safeguarding agenda.  
The Consultation states clearly that ‘failing to safeguard and promote 
the welfare of children . . . includes failing to protect them from the harm 
caused by extremism’.61 And in guidance to schools about the ‘prevent’ duty, 
the government goes as far as to suggest that the risk of radicalisation: 
‘is similar in nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, 
gangs, neglect, sexual exploitation). Whether these come from within 
their family or are the product of outside influence’.62 
While the Consultation has excluded reviewing the arrangements relating to 
home education from its remit, the new statutory ‘prevent’ duties relating to 
‘radicalisation’ do apply to local authorities’ functions relating to home 
education. 
Section 26(1) of The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 requires 
local authorities63 in the exercise of their functions to ‘have due regard to the 
need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. And section 36 
requires them to ensure ‘that a panel of persons is in place for its area ‘with 
the function of assessing the extent to which identified individuals are 
vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism’. 
The general guidance about the ‘prevent’ duty advises that it ‘does not 
confer new functions on any specified authority’ and that ‘due regard’ means 
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that authorities ‘should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to 
prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other 
factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions’.64  
The ‘prevent’ duty clearly includes local authority functions relating to 
home education. But while detailed advice about the implications of this duty 
has been provided to schools and childminders,65 home education is not 
referred to. Home education is however referred to in the general guidance 
about the duty in the context of ‘out of school settings supporting children’.66  
Putting aside the complex questions of legitimacy and effectiveness 
raised by the ‘prevent’ agenda more generally, and they are not 
unsubstantial,67 it is suggested that the removal of home education by parents 
from the remit of the Consultation is problematic; all the more so as the 
general ‘prevent’ guidance, as noted above, makes clear that the risk of 
radicalisation can come ‘from within the family’.68 At the very least the 
Guidance about home education requires revising to clarify the position and 
especially in light of Sir Michael Wilshaw’s concern about the potential 
loophole that home education provides for those who wish to avoid any 
attention. 
One way in which it might, in theory, be possible to reconcile the 
Consultation’s avoidance of the issue of home education with the 
government’s identification of risk of radicalisation as a safeguarding issue, 
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would be to suggest that the risk is anomalous to the parental right to use 
corporal punishment. In other words, a harm to be prevented if carried out by 
anyone other than a parent. Indeed while the Consultation proposes ‘to 
ensure that corporal punishment is not a practice adopted in out-of-school 
settings’,69 children’s rights campaigns to outlaw parental chastisement have 
consistently met with government resistance.70 However the analogy is 
inconsistent with emerging, albeit controversial, developments in the field of 
child protection. For unlike lawful parental chastisement, harm resulting from 
radicalisation has been accepted as a legitimate ground for the non-
consensual separating of young people from their family.71  There are 
questions of degree here, but if the draconian step of removing children from 
their parents is in certain circumstances legitimate on the basis of the risk of 
radicalisation, it is difficult to understand why monitoring home education is 
not.  
 
‘SUFFICIENT EDUCATION’ AND ‘RADICALISATION’ 
 
While the Consultation conflates ‘welfare’ with ‘radicalisation’, by locating the 
latter within the safeguarding agenda, it consequently indicates that the 
content of education itself is now considered an aspect of safeguarding. This 
is clear from the Consultation as it is informed by the belief that:  
‘ . . . it is right to expect children to be in a safe environment and 
somewhere which does not teach children views which undermine our 
fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty 
and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’.72 
This brings to the fore two issues; the existing arrangements about the 
content of home education more widely and the specific impact of the 
concerns about radicalisation and the place of civic education within the legal 
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definition of ‘suitable education’. Both issues are explored below.  
 
Regulating the content of home education 
Where a child is a ‘registered pupil’, the content of education, at maintained 
schools, is effectively prescribed by the National Curriculum; and while it does 
not apply to independent schools, increased regulation of that sector extends 
to imposing compliance with detailed curriculum requirements.73 None of 
these statutory provisions apply to a child who is home educated and as the 
Select Committee noted: 
‘Home educators prize the flexibility that they have to shape provision 
to their child’s needs and to follow their child’s motivations, as opposed 
to fitting around external frameworks or working through a set plan’.74 
The Guidance advises that ‘it is important to recognise that there are many, 
equally valid, approaches to educational provision’75 and emphasises the 
freedom that parents who home educate have by advising that:  
‘Home educating parents are not required to: teach the national 
curriculum; provide a broad and balanced education; have a timetable; 
have premises equipped to any particular standard; set hours during 
which education will take place; have any specific qualifications; make 
detailed plans in advance; observe school hours, days or terms; give 
formal lessons, mark work done by their child; formally assess 
progress or set development objectives; reproduce school type per 
group socialization76, match school, age-specific standards’.77 
The Guidance is much less clear about what should be required, advising 
that: 
‘local authorities may reasonably expect the provision to include the 
following: consistent involvement or other significant carers – it is 
expected that parents or significant carers would play a substantial role 
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although not necessarily constantly or actively involved in providing 
education; recognition of the child’s needs, attitudes and aspirations; 
opportunities for the child to be stimulated by their learning 
experiences; access to resources/material required to provide home 
education for the child – such as paper and pens, books and libraries, 
arts and crafts materials, physical activity, ICT and the opportunity for 
appropriate interaction with other children and adults.78  
Furthermore, the Guidance currently provides no advice about the 
implications on home education of Section 13A of the Education Act 1996. 
This provision requires that: 
(1) A local education authority shall ensure that their functions relating 
to the provision of education  . . . are  . . . exercised by the authority 
with a view to- 
- promoting high standards, 
-  . . .  ensuring fair access to educational opportunity, and 
- promoting the fulfilment by every child concerned of his educational 
potential.79  
The provision applies to ‘children of compulsory school age (whether at 
school or otherwise)’,80 which makes clear that it applies to home-educated 
children. The duty does not refer simply to education provided by local 
authorities but to their functions relating to the provision of education and the 
government clarified this in 2010 by stating that the duty refers to ‘all children 
of compulsory school age’.81 
The Badman Review recommended that home education families 
should be required to submit a statement of their educational approach. This 
was supported in principle by the Select Committee which also called for a 
‘more precise definition of what constitutes “suitable” education’, which would 
‘encompass a positive expectation in relation to, at least, the acquisition of 
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basic skills’.82  
Both the requirement of such a statement and the light touch 
requirement of basic skills are welcome suggestions. The latter, not only 
because it emphasises a positive requirement, but also because literacy is a 
means of learning about the wider world. It is in this way a key aspect of civic 
education.  
 
Civic education and ‘suitable education’ 
In light of the Consultation’s concerns about ‘extremism’, the extent to which 
the definition of ‘suitable education’ addresses civic education requires 
clarification. As noted above the Guidance advises that home education, in 
contrast to schools, does not need to ‘provide a broad and balanced 
education’. But it also refers to the case of R v Secretary of State for 
Education and Science ex p Talmud Torah Machzikei Hadass School Trust83 
and quotes Woolf J’s finding that an education is ‘suitable’ if it: 
‘ . . . primarily equips a child for life within the community of which he is 
a member, rather than the way of life in the country as a whole, as long 
as it does not foreclose the child's options in later years to adopt some 
other form of life if he wishes to do so’. 
This case concerned the adequacy of the curriculum of an independent 
orthodox Jewish school.84 It is particularly pertinent here because of 
OFSTED’s concerns about the provision in unregistered schools of ‘a narrow 
Islamic-focused curriculum’85 and the Consultation’s emphasis on the 
importance of ‘individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of 
different faiths and beliefs’.86 Woolf J’s interpretation, arguably far less 
prescriptive than the ‘prevent’ agenda, suggests that a child, at a minimum, 
requires basic literacy skills to be able to learn about other lifestyles. But it 
could also be interpreted to mean that a child needs, at least in some way, to 
be aware of the existence of other lifestyles and values.  
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Balancing parental, community and children’s independent rights is a 
complex exercise. And especially in the highly politicised context of 
education.87 Article 29 of the UNCRC is critical here as it states that the 
education of the child shall be directed to: ‘The development of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms . . .’88, ‘the preparation of the child 
for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, 
tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, 
national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin’,89 and respect 
‘for civilizations different from his or her own’.90 These provisions are 
complemented by the requirement that education must also be directed to, 
‘the development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural 
identity, and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is 
living, the country from which he or she may originate . . . ‘91 and by the 
requirement that subject to conforming to the above, the requirements should 
not, ‘interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct 
educational institutions’.92 As Harris notes, however, in the context of faith 
schools, ‘the legal and rights frameworks have yet to provide an entirely 
coherent means of resolving such conflicts’.93  
The Consultation states that, ‘extremism’94 poses a serious and 
unprecedented threat to our country’.95 In doing so it makes clear that 
prescribing the content of ‘suitable education’ protects not just the child’s right 
to education but has wider social and political motivations. There is nothing 
new here; education has never been provided solely on the basis that it is in 
‘the best interests of the child’, and their own views are largely ignored.96 In 
the context of home education the legitimacy of wider motivations was upheld 
                                                        
87
 See Harris, Education, Law and Diversity (Hart, 2006). 
88
 Article 29(1)(b). 
89
 Ibid art 29(1)(d). 
90
 Ibid art 29(1)(c). 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Ibid art 29(2). 
93
 Harris, at 460 above, 
94
 This is defined as ‘the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as 
extremist.’ Consultation Fn 6 p13. 
95
 Ibid para 2.1. 
96
 See Finch, Education as Social Policy (Longman, 1984). Consequently compliance with 
Articles 3 and 12 of the UNCRC in the context of education is highly debatable. See Monk 
(2002) op cit, n 13. 
 22 
by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Konrad and Others v 
Germany.97 Reconciling a ban on home education with the parents’ privacy 
rights under Article 8, the court held that the German Constitutional Court’s 
emphasis on the ‘general interest of society to avoid the emergence of parallel 
societies based on separate philosophical convictions and the importance of 
integrating minorities into society’ was ‘necessary in a democratic society and 
in the public interest of securing the education of the child’.98 
The debate here goes to the heart of political and philosophical 
debates about the inherent tensions within liberal democracy. In the specific 
context of home education the educational political theorist Rob Reich has 
argued that enabling children to be ‘minimally autonomous’ protects them 
from ethical servility and, as such, is both in the public interest and a right of 
the child.99 This constructive argument can be used to support the call for 
ensuring that all home educated children have, at the very least, basic literacy 
skills. But, commenting more widely, the political theorist Paul Hirst notes how  
‘embattled defenders of liberalism often thicken the doctrine to the point 
where it becomes prescriptive and exclusive rather than neutral and 
procedural’.100 Similarly Wendy Brown asks: ‘what kinds of attachments to 
unfreedom can be discerned in contemporary political formulations ostensibly 
concerned with emancipation?’101 These warnings lend support to regulation 
of a light touch nature, especially in the context of home education, for the 
existence of the option is often cited in order to legitimise intervention in 
education by the state elsewhere.102 
The Consultation explicitly recognises that intervention in ‘out of school 
settings’ requires a difficult balancing exercise. It emphasises that it aims to 
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be ‘proportionate’ in its approach,103 intends to avoid ‘imposing unnecessary 
burdens’104 and that ‘the registration requirement would be light-touch’.105 It 
also makes clear that the proposals ‘are not about regulating religion or 
infringing people’s freedom to follow a particular faith or hold particular 
beliefs’.106 
However in the context of ‘extremism’, in its attempt to appear to limit 
the remit of the proposals it arguably contradicts itself. In making risk based 
inspections it states that OFSTED would not ‘be tasked with looking at the 
suitability of education’.107 But it subsequently states that one of the 
‘prohibited activities’ that are to be specifically targeted by inspections is: 
‘Undesirable teaching, for example teaching which undermines or is 
incompatible with fundamental British values, or which promotes 
extremist views’.108 
It is hard not to see this focus as anything other than a clear attempt by the 
government to delineate the definition of a ‘suitable education’.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since the dropping of the provisions about home education in the 2009 Bill 
there has been a studied governmental reluctance to revisit the issue. The 
Consultation’s explicit rejection of Sir Michael Wilshaw’s recommendation to 
review the arrangements relating to home education is further evidence of this 
reluctance. The government’s commitment to respecting the right of parents 
to home educate is a welcome recognition of an important political and civil 
liberty, all the more so in an age of increasing surveillance.109 But the 
Consultation’s willingness to adopt invasive and compulsory policies in the 
context of ‘radicalisation’ demonstrates the contingency of privacy claims and 
a practice of ad hoc politicised policy making. The Consultation brings to the 
fore the consequences of a lack of joined up policy making; it creates an 
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effective loophole to the proposals and by conflating the distinction between 
‘safeguarding’ and ‘education’ it highlights and exacerbates the long-standing 
inconsistencies and confusions about the regulation of home education. 
There is a widely acknowledged need for statutory clarification of the 
role of local authorities in this area. However many of the current uncertainties 
could be resolved by simply revising the Guidance. Where there is the political 
will Guidance can be revised quickly, as the two changes in 2013 about flexi-
schooling demonstrated.110  
If the proposals in the Consultation are enacted they will introduce an 
enhanced form of monitoring of some home-educated children who are partly 
educated in ‘out of school settings’. Wherever the threshold is set the 
Guidance will need to address this. Notwithstanding this the Guidance needs 
to provide advice to local authorities about the impact of Section 26 of the 
Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and to clarify their duties arising 
under Sections 13A and 436A of the Education Act 1996 and Section 175 of 
the Education Act 2002. With regard to the key duty in Section 436 of the 
Education Act 1996 the advice in the Guidance needs to acknowledge the 
broader interpretation provided in Philips v Brown and the clear message from 
R (SD and PD) v Essex County Council. The Guidance is right to emphasise 
the benefits of informal communication. But it needs to provide advice about 
situations where, for whatever reason, this is not possible. Addressing these 
issues by reference to the general statutory duties and to the case law will 
reassure local authorities that where, in exercising their discretion, they opt to 
take a more pro-active role, such actions are lawful.  
It is important to emphasise that addressing the above issues would 
simply clarify the existing powers and duties of local authorities. It would not 
extend them in any way. Introducing a system of compulsory registration, on 
the other hand, would require statutory reform. While rejected in 2009 and, as 
with all compulsory schemes, raising inevitable enforcement issues, the 
absence of such a requirement implicitly legitimises the present situation 
whereby local authorities have no knowledge of home-educated children in 
their area. Such a position is in principle hard to reconcile with the legitimate 
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role of the state in actively protecting a child’s right to education. Having, 
unintentionally, placed home education back on the agenda it is time for the 
government to dust off and revisit the proposals in the 2009 Bill. 
